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DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION-JOINT OWNERSHIP-IMPOSITION OF CON-
STRUCTIVE TRUST ON MURDERER OF Co-TENANT-A husband, owning land 
with his wife as tenants by the entireties, killed her and immediately there-
after committed suicide. In an action to determine ownership of the realty, 
both the probate and appellate1 courts declared that since a relevant 
disinheritance statute2 was inapplicable, full title vested in the husband 
and, upon his death, descended to his heirs. On appeal, held, reversed. 
Despite the common law nature of such tenancies, equity will impose on the 
husband a constructive trust in one-half the property for the benefit of 
the victim's estate. National City Bank of Evansville v. Bledsoe, (Ind. 
1957) 144 N.E. (2d) 710. 
In order to prevent the enjoyment of property acquired by descent or 
devise from the victim of murder, yet avoid a questionable interpretation 
of the statutes of wills and intestacy,3 many writers have favored impos-
ing on the slayer a constructive trust in favor of the decedent's estate.4 
Since it is generally agreed that to allow retention of such interests by 
1 Nat. City Bank of Evansville v. Bledsoe, (Ind. App. 1956) 133 N.E. (2d) 887. 
2 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1953 Repl.) §6-212, providing that one " ... legally convicted 
of intentionally causing the death of another . . . shall . . . become a constructive 
trustee of any property . . . acquired by him . . . because of such death. • . ." The 
husband, by reason of his suicide, of course was never "legally convicted." 
3 A minority of decisions in the absence of disinheriting statutes have concluded a 
murderer may take no interests from his victim by reading into the laws of descent and 
devise an exception based on public policy and supposed legislative intent. E.g., Box 
v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393, 79 S.W. 1042 (1904); Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 165 A. 
470 (1933). 
4 Ames, "Can a Murderer Acquire Title By His Crime and Keep It?" LECTURES ON 
LEGAL HISTORY 310 (1913); BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §478 (1946); SCOTT, TRUSTS, 2d 
ed., §§492, 493.2 (1956); REsTITUTION RESTATEMENT §§187, 188 (1937). 
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the slayer is undesirable,5 this solution is becoming increasingly accept-
able to the courts.6 With joint ownership, however, a basic objection to 
use of the trust has arisen since, under the theoretical nature of these 
tenancies, a survivor obtains no additional interest through the death 
of his co-tenant.7 Most recent decisions, absent statute, have not considered 
this argument conclusive.8 Considering that as a practical matter sub-
stantial benefit does accrue,9 and that the reason for equitable intervention 
is as strong here as in the cases of inheritance, these courts appear justified 
in disregarding the technical rules of title. Ostensibly, a more serious 
threat to the trust solution is the existence, presently in some thirty 
states, of disinheriting legislation. As these laws are generally drafted to 
preclude only taking by descent or devise,10 an intent on the part of 
legislatures to allow the surviving joint owner retention of his full interest 
could be inferred. This has been the result in the majority of jurisdictions 
where prior to enactment the murderer was allowed to take.11 In Illinois12 
and Indiana,13 however, the common law appears to have been reversed 
on grounds of the general policy indicated by the statutes.14 Similarly, in 
states where the issue had not previously been resolved in the slayer's 
favor, the statutes have been said to supplement rather than supersede 
common law ideas.15 On the whole, these laws have not been conclusive 
in joint ownership litigation. 
5 E.g., New York Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, II7 U.S. 591 at 600 (1886). 
6 E.g., Du till v. Dana, 148 Me. 541, 113 A. (2d) 499 (1952); Whitney v. Lott, 134 
N.J. Eq. 586, 36 A. (2d) 888 (1944). Technical objections to the constructive trust in this 
situation are collected in Wade, "Acquisition of Property By Wilfully Killing Another," 
49 HARV. L. R.Ev. 715 (1936). 
7 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §478 (1946). In this note, joint ownership refers 
to any tenancy involving the right of survivorship. 
8 E.g., Budwit v. Hurr, 339 Mich. 265, 63 N.W. (2d) 841 (1954); Neiman v. Hurff, 
11 N.J. 55, 93 A. (2d) 345 (1952). See, generally, annotation in 32 A.L.R. (2d) 1099 (1953). 
9 Death entitles the survivor to exclusive use and enjoyment, allows him to alienate 
the property freely, and removes the possibility of his interest being divested. Tyler v. 
United States, 281 U.S. 497 (1930). 
10 At least two statutes, S.D. Code (1939) §§56.0502, 56.0505(1), and Wash. Rev. Code 
§11.52.012, Laws (1955) c. 141, directly include joint ownership. Absent a specific reference, 
however, no case has been found construing the statutes as applicable to these tenancies 
although the language in several conceivably lends itself to such interpretation; e.g., 
Utah Code Ann. (1953) §74-3-22. 
11 Smith v. Greenburg, 121 Colo. 417, 218 P. (2d) 514 (1950); Wenker v. Landon, 161 
Ore. 265, 88 P. (2d) 971 (1939); In re Foster's Estate, (Kan. 1958) 320 P. (2d) 855, which 
says at 860, " ... the legislature has pre-empted the field and subject matter, and 
••. has [not] ..• seen -fit to limit or restrict the right of a surviving joint tenant . •• :• 
12 Bradley v. Fox, 7 Ill. (2d) 106, 129 N.E. (2d) 699 (1955). 
13 Principal case. 
14 For a strong disapproval of this procedure, see principal case at appellate level, 
note 1 supra, at 892. 
115 E.g., Smith v. Dean, 226 Ark. 438, 290 S.W. (2d) 439 (1956); Ashwood v. Patterson, 
(Fla. 1951) 49 S. (2d) 848; Cowan v. Pleasant, (Ky. 1954) 263 S.W. (2d) 494. Thus, in 
Leggette v. Smith, 226 S.C. 403 at 407, 408, 85 S.E. (2d) 576 (1955), it was said the statute 
served only to make criminal conviction conclusive in a subsequent civil action. 
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Granting, then, that a trust is to be imposed, two distinct and con-
filcting theories are employed in determining what portion of the estate 
will be divested. By one, the survivor retains that life estate in half the 
property to which he always was entitled but, in most instances, must 
surrender the remainder.16 The alternative, illustrated by the principal case, 
whereby the victim's heirs are given an undivided one-half of the entire 
property is currently more popular17 despite what appears to be a fallacious 
premise. According to this view death, like divorce, must sever the entirety 
tenancy.18 Further, when death is wrongfully caused by the co-tenant, 
that person cannot be said to survive in contemplation of the law, and 
since neither party is then eligible to claim the whole by right of survivor-
ship, it must be held through a tenancy in common.19 This analysis fails 
to consider substantive differences presented by the situations of divorce 
and murder. In the former, the problem is to distribute property between 
two living co-owners, neither of whose claim is necessarily more equitable 
than that of the other; in the latter, it is to divest the remaining owner 
of whatever practical gain he has wrongfully acquired. Thus, a conclusion 
that the interest of the murderer should rise no higher than that of the 
divorcee2° fails to reach the more meaningful question of whether it should 
rise as high as that of the divorcee. As the killing has precluded a natural 
determination of who ultimately will enjoy the benefits of survivorship, 
it would appear more reasonable to resolve any doubt against the slayer 
and, as in the first approach, take from him the remainder interest.21 
However, when theory is but a device of justification for decision, as is 
probably the case in this area, it should not be unduly criticized if in the 
final analysis substantive justice has been achieved. It is submitted that, 
absent controlling legislation, where the slayer is alive and a party to the 
action, he should retain only a life interest in one-half the property; but 
where, as in the instant case, both parties are deceased, the property 
should be equally divided among the respective heirs. There appears no 
good reason for penalizing anyone not a party to the criminal act; yet 
when the murderer is dead this must necessarily happen unless there is 
16 Neiman v. Hurff, note 8 supra; Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927); 
Colton v. Wade, 32 Del. Ch. 122, 80 A. (2d) 923 (1951). It has been held that the slayer 
may retain the remainder interest if, when the killing occurs, his life expectancy exceeded 
that of ·his victim. Sherman v. Weber, 113 N.J. Eq. 451, 167 A. 517 (1933). 
17 Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S.W. (2d) 757 (1930); Bradley v. Fox, 
note 12 supra; Cowan v. Pleasant, note 15 supra; Budwit v. Hurr, note 8 supra; Ashwood 
v. Patterson, note 15 supra. 
18 This is because the fictitious unity of the person upon which such ownership is 
predicated has been dissolved. 2 BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 6th ed., §716 (1881). 
19 First stated in Barnett v. Couey, note 17 supra, at 921. 
20 Barnett v. Couey, note 17 supra, at 919, cited in principal case at 715. 
21 Since mortality tables are but calculated estimates, it does not seem inequitable 
to disregard them in this connection. But see BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §478 (1946). 
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an equal division of the fee.22 As equity is remedial, the constructive trust 
solution, if accepted, should remain sensitive to what are significant factual 
variations.28 The Indiana result is appealing, therefore, not because a 
murderer's interest is akin to that of a divorcee, but because the opposing 
interests were, in substance, those of innocent third parties. 
John B. Schwemm, S.Ed. 
22 Only the Kentucky court appears to have given any great weight to this factor, 
however. Cowan v. Pleasant, note 15 supra. 
28 Vanneman, "The Constructive Trust," 10 UNIV. Crn. L. REv. 366 at 391 (1936). 
